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ABSTRACT 
The State of Illinois has had a well established Emergency Medical System 
disaster response plan since the 1970s. In the case of a wide spread event the 
readily available provider resources could be quickly depleted. The concept of 
an extended statewide medical emergency response was conceived in the mid-
1990s. IMERT (Illinois Medical Emergency Response Team) was established. 
While it is well respected and a role model for other states, the organization is not 
without inadequacies. This paper is an evaluation of the IMERT program to date. 
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In 1988 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, The Future of Public Health, 
proc I aimed public health to be in disarray and prompted national discussion about 
the status of public health and steps necessary to strengthen its role. The 
Institute's report defined the mission of public health as, "fulfilling society's 
interest in assuring conditions in which people can be healthy. Public Health is 
distinguished from health care by its focus on community-wide concerns- the 
public interest-- rather than the health interests of particular individuals or groups. 
Its aim is to organize community effort to address public concerns about health by 
applying scientific and technical knowledge." 1 This report devised a simple 
conceptual framework for describing core public health activities and identified 
three core public health frmctions. They are: assessment; policy development; and 
assurance. These fundamental guidelines have since served as the basis for 
performance monitoring and improvement efforts in public health. 
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the early 1990's 
specified a list often public health practices that linked directly with the three 
IOM core functions. 2 In 1994 The U.S. Public Health Service released the report 
of the Essential Public Health Services Work Group of the Core Public Health 
Functions Steering Committee, entitled Public Health in America3 Here the 
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vision, mission, responsibilities, and ten essential services of public health 
services were identified. They fall into the three core functions and are as 
follows: 
Public Health 
• Prevents epidemics and the spread of disease 
• Protects against environmental hazards 
• Prevents injuries 
• Promotes and encourages healthy behaviors 
• Responds to disasters and assists communities in recovery 
• Assures the quality and accessibility of health services 
Essential Public Health Services 
• Monitor health status to identifY community health problems 
• Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the 
community 
• Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues 
• Mobilize community partnerships to identifY and solve health problems 
• Develop policies and plans that support individual and community health 
efforts 
• Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety 
• Link people to needed personal health services and assure the provision of 
health care when otherwise unavailable 
• Assure a competent public health and personal health care workforce 
• Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and 
population-based health services 
• Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems 4 
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One public health responsibility of personal interest is "responds to disasters and 
assists communities in recovery." Both resources recognized evaluation of the 
effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of programs to be essential. I am a 
member of an organization that provides response to disasters and in this paper 
will provide my evaluation of this volunteer state-sponsored medical response 
team, based upon research, personal involvement, and interviews, and how the 
organization meets many of the essential public health services. 
Disaster medicine is difficult to conceptualize. It is broadly defined in several 
ways. The Joint Commission on Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO) defines an emergency as "a natural or manmade event that suddenly or 
significantly disrupts the environment of care; disrupts care and treatment; or ; 
changes or increases demands for the organization's services.5 The World Health 
Organization defines a disaster as a "sudden ecological phenomenon of sufficient 
magnitude to require external assistance. "6 The American College of Emergency 
Physicians states that a disaster has occurred "when the destmctive effects of 
natural or man-made forces overwhelm the ability of a given area or community 
to meet the demand for health care."7 Other definitions exist, but the common 
denominator calls for a dismption of such magnitude that the organization, 
infrastructure, and resources of a community are unable to return to normal 
operations following the event without outside assistance. According to 
Mothershead, "when a disaster strikes, the general population expects public 
service agencies and other branches of the local, state, or federal government to 
rapidly mobilize to help the community. Preservation of life and health are of 
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paramount importance to those individuals affected by these disasters. For this 
reason, medical professionals must be included in all phases of disaster planning 
as well as in the immediate response to these events. "8 
That state of Illinois has had well developed all hazards emergency response and 
disaster plans since the latel970s. James R. Thompson, Illinois' longest-serving 
governor ( 1977-1991 ), recognized our vulnerabilities and made public health 
programs a priority. A major airplane crash at Chicago's O'Hare International L 
airport in 1979 and cyanide tainted Tylenol deaths in 1980 tested the response 
system and the local and state departments of public health. 9 
Illinois has a vast, very well traveled interstate highway system and railways. 
Hazardous materials are transported along numerous routes. Lake Michigan, part 
of a connected waterway, borders the east coast of the state. Tornadoes have 
leveled communities in years past. The City of Chicago is a major business hub 
with the stock exchange and numerous state and federal governmental buildings. L 
There and in surrounding suburbs are headquarters of many national and global 
businesses. Mass transit systems abound and Chicago is home to professional 
sports teams events that draw huge numbers of attendees. Illinois has more 
nuclear power plants than any other state in the nation. It is also a region rich 
with agriculture. The state houses universities with major research centers. 
Downstate is the state capitol of Springfield, a city of great historical significance 
as the birthplace of President Abraham Lincoln. 
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Terrorists have the knowledge and capability to strike anywhere in the world. All 
connnunities are vulnerable to incidents involving terrorism, but particularly those 
situated along routes with high transportation and access potential, or 
manufacturing and testing facilities. Other examples oflocations that may 
become targets for criminal or terrorist activity include public assembly, public 
buildings, mass transit systems, areas with high economic impact, 
teleconnnunications facilities and places with historical or symbolic 
siguificance. 10 "Illinois could be a target for a terrorist attack. It was on the top 
five list of the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center."11 
In 1996 Chicago hosted the Democratic National Convention (DNC) at the United 
Center, a large urban sports arena with a capacity of30,000 seats located adjacent 
to the downtown Chicago loop. A large number of governmental YIPs, including 
both the President and Vice President of the United States, attended all or a 
portion of the event. For approximately one year prior to this event, a process of 
cooperative planning for an influx of nearly 30,000 individuals (delegates, media, 
security personnel, support staff, YIPs and others) was undertaken. Participants 
in the planning included the Chicago Police and Fire Departments, the Bureau of 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), private EMS providers, Chicago Transit 
Authority, US Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and others. They developed and executed a 
unique, decentralized and flexible medical response with contingency mass-
casualty field hospitals. The event was without incident and the patients who 
were treated had only minor injuries or illnesses. One ofthe most important 
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lessons learned was that sufficient planning and attention is needed to be 
proactively devoted to equipment, supplies, personnel, and organizational needs 
in the development of such a mass-gathering response with potential for acts of 
violence or terrorism. 12 
The DNC experience was a success because of months of planning with all the 
necessary resources in place, with staff on call for the next shift, and because 
there was thankfully no event that occurred to test the capacity. Realistically acts 
of terrorism, and sometimes even natural disasters, do not occur with adequate or 
anywarnmg. 
An act of terrorism could deplete existing resources, and exceed surge capacity. 
A table-top disaster drill was conducted in conjunction with planning for the 
DNC. A young emergency medicine physician, Moses Lee, M.D., was the EMS 
Medical Director at Cook County Hospital, where victims would likely be 
transported if an event occurred at the convention. He learned the table-top drill 
was to be conducted and while not invited, he managed to attend. His observation 
was that no representative emergency department physicians or nurses were 
involved in this planning. Further he knew most emergency department staff 
were not trained how to recognize, assess or safely treat victims of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). The recent terrorist attacks in Tokyo confirmed his 
beliefs that locally we lacked systems to provide medical support in the "field", 
i.e. pre-hospital setting. Dr. Lee had identified a community health problem. He 
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personally started seeking more information on large scale preparedness, incident 
command, and bioterrorism recognition by attending presentations offered by the 
Department of Justice and other credible agencies. 13 These initial steps reflect the 
intent of essential public health services 1 and 2. 14 
Nationally more attention was becoming focused on potential threats of terrorism. 
In fiscal year 1999 the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
f--
created the Bioterrorism and Response Initiative, aimed at upgrading our national 
capacity to respond to bioterrorism and developing a formal response 
infrastructure in public health departments. Emergency medical services (EMS) 
fi.mding was not specifically considered in this DHHS program, primarily because 
EMS is usually funded through traditional first-responder programs in other 
departments of the U.S. govermnent. 15 That same year CDC awarded more than 
$44 million for bioterrorism preparedness to states and cities for enhancements in 
laboratory and electronic communication capacity. Illinois received over $1 
million that year (and in 2000 and 2001) to support the development of the Health 
Alert Network information and communications systems, and to fund laboratory 
capacity improvements. 16 CDC expended another $32 million to establish a 
national pharmaceutical stockpile to ensure availability of vaccines, prophylactic 
medications, chemical antidotes, medical supplies, and equipment needed to 
support a medical response to a biologic or chemical krrorist incident. 
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In the Chicago area in 1999 Dr. Lee convened a small group of emergency 
physicians, nurses, and toxicologists who met with key stakeholders in the 
Division of Emergency Medical Services of the Illinois Department of Public 
Health. Initially the group's intent was to assess the level of awareness and 
preparedness of emergency department personnel in lllinois to respond to a large-
scale WMD event that might overwhehn hospitals and surrounding communities. 
Although planning to enhance preparedness for a major incident was underway in 
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many large cities, the Illinois group realized that the state as a whole needed a 
network of coordinated mutual support and a more systematic approach to 
responding to a large scale catastrophe. They realized that it was important to 
develop organized protocols, formalize communications systems and recognize a 
core of specially prepared responders to assist in case of a mass casualty event, 
including one resulting from a WMD. Mobilization of community partnerships 
was initiated to address the community health issue and policies and plans to 
support community health efforts were underway. 17 These next steps mirror 
essential public health services 4 and 5. 18 
In the summer of 1999, The lllinois Department of Public Health, along with this 
group, applied for and received a grant from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) for seed funding for the lllinois Medical Emergency Response 
Team (IMERT) to develop educational and infrastructure to formalize the ability 
to respond to mass casualty events. 19 John Lumpkin, MD, MPH, then Director of 
the lllinois Department of Public Health and Leslie Stein'Spencer, RN, MS, then 
Chief of EMS, were key supporters and participants in the process. 
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An executive council, IMERTEC, was created to oversee the development of 
IMERT. IMERTEC members include emergency physicians, nurses, and 
paramedics with leadership experience in EMS and disaster planning, as well as 
selected individuals with relevant military and technical expertise. Advisors from 
governmental agencies, such as the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH), 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the US Public Health Service 
(USPHS) also sit on the IMERTEC, which is chaired by Dr. Lee. 
Concurrently bioterrorism (BT) preparedness planning in the state began in 
October 1999 under the auspices of an interagency group, the Illinois Terrorism 
Task Force (ITTF), which was formalized under order of the governor the 
following May. From the beginning BT planning was integrated into the state's 
emergency operations plan, coordinated by Illinois Emergency Management 
Agency (IEMA.i0 IMERT became one of the agencies on the ITTF. 
Initial efforts of the founding IMERT members were directed at developing the 
first lecture series in Illinois on Domestic Preparedness for hospital-based 
providers.21 Topics covered included recognition of and incident response to 
explosive, chemical, radiological and biological events. The program content was 
developed and distributed in conjunction with the Illinois College of Emergency 
Physicians (ICEP). The IMERT office resides within the ICEP building. 
The IMERT founders then considered creating medical support teams. They 
studied the National Disaster Medical Systems' Disaster Medical Assistance 
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Teams (DMAT) structure and position descriptions. The National Disaster 
Medical System is an asset sharing partnership designed to provide emergency 
medical assistance to States following a catastrophic disaster or other major 
emergency. The system is designed to care for victims of any incident that 
exceeds the medical care capability of the affected local and State resources. The 
Department of Health and Human Services in partnership with other Federal 
agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency administer the program. L 
"A Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) is a group of medical and 
support personnel designed to provide emergency medical care during a disaster 
or other unusual event. DMATs deploy to disaster sites with adequate supplies 
and equipment to support themselves for a period of72 hours while providing 
medical care at a fixed or temporary medical site. They may provide primary 
health care and/or augment overloaded local health care staff. DMATs are 
designed to be a rapid-response element to supplement local medical care until 
other Federal or contract resources can be mobilized, or the situation resolved." 22 
These guidelines were then adapted by IMERTEC for a regional approach. 
IMERT team composition initially was established to consist of two teams of four 
to five medical personnel. Each team was comprised of a physician (MD or DO), 
a registered nurse (RN), an emergency medical technician-paramedic (EMT-P), 
and one or two other members with a minimum qualification of emergency 
medical technician (EMT.) More recently team positions were developed for 
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other allied health professionals such as physician assistants (PA) and dentists 
(DDS). Teams are organized throughout the state based upon the three Illinois 
IEMA regions and in conjunction with the Metropolitan Medical Response 
System (MMRS) in the City of Chicago. (see map below) Teams are supported 
with appropriate equipment and provided with ongoing educational opportunities 
within or near their regions.Z3 
Illinois Department of Public Health 
Illinois Mobile Emergency Response Teams (IMERT) 
I 
f 
The original team name was not identified as 'medical' but instead 'mobile'. 
· During a press statement the Governor misspoke and from that moment on we 
have been known as a medical team. As a result a new uniform logo was 
designed and put into production. 
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The IMERT mission statement was developed. It reads, "The Illinois Medical 
Emergency Response Team will respond to and assist with emergency medical 
treatment at mass casualty incidents, including, but not limited to, chemical, 
biological, and radiological incidents when a need is identified. The team will 
respond when activated by the Director of Public Health or designee." 24 
Initial recruitment efforts targeted physicians, nurses or emergency medical 
technicians with current experience in emergency medicine or critical care who 7--
had a desire to volunteer with time to help the community in time of need. 
General requirements included age 18 or above, citizen or permanent resident of 
the U.S., maintenance of a current and unrestricted license, certification or 
registration required by team position, availability to report to a pre-designated 
assembly point within four hours for an assignment, physically fit to handle the 
rigors of disaster event environments, and meeting individual team qualifications 
for the appropriate position. Members are required to have an up-to-date medical 
history on file, attend scheduled mandatory education sessions and team meetings, 
and adhere to the IMERT code of conduct and all policies pertaining to team 
participation, involvement, and activities. Members are also responsible for 
updating contact information, certifications, immunizations, and changes in health 
status as changes occur. 
Team education and training requirements include completion of a basic incident 
command course, a WMD response to terrorism course in a classroom setting or 
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online through Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). IMERT 
continues to offer the 4 hour Domestic Preparedness course for which attendance 
is encouraged. In addition every team member must attend and complete an 
IMERT "Boot Camp" training session. Here members are oriented to team 
policies and procedures, become familiar with the IMERT equipment bags, 
receive uniforms, and practice selected skills. Initially at Boot Camp, IMERT 
members here should also be issued an identification card by IDPH indicating 
IMERT membership with the requirement it be worn at any training or 
deployment. Annual training now includes participation in at least two team 
training sessions such as equipment review or deployment debriefings, and/or 
drills. Essential public health service # 8 is demonstrated with these activities25 
Some communications regarding training have been unclear. Members 
periodically receive email invitations to attend educational sessions. Then days 
later a new message arrives with the same offering but with a new date, time and 
location. While it may be clear to the IMERT staff that this reflects multiple 
classes of the same session by region, it has not been conveyed as such. 
Suggestions have been submitted to provide a list of all sites and date related to 
each training meeting. 
The time commitment is a minimum of being available (on call) to be activated 4 
weeks per year. Call time is scheduled according to a member's own schedule. 
IMERT has established both ground and air transportation assistance to get team 
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members to the disaster site. If a disaster occurs in a member's home region, 
teams from other regions would be activated to respond to the affected region. 
Each member is responsible for supplying his/her own personal and toiletries 
clothing cache and food and water for the period of deployment. Generally the 
maximum time is 72 hours. The only paid individuals with IMERT are the team 
coordinator and administrator. Their salaries are paid by the lllinois College of 
Emergency Physicians and they are contracted to the lllinois Department of 
Public Health (IDPH). 
Each team member is required to maintain a text receiving wireless device 
(cellular phone, text pager, or PDA) in order to receive activation and other 
notices from IMERT. Initially only on call members were test paged weekly to 
ensure that correct numbers were on file. Then a system became available with 
capabilities of sending an automatic page to every member each Monday morning 
at 8:00 a.m. to test continued connectivity. When that process began, however, it l 
was not first communicated that it was just a test and members need not respond. 
The IMERT office phones were flooded with concerned members who were not 
on call but were paged, and by those who suspected they were going to be 
deployed. With the change to daylight savings time late October the Monday 
morning page arrived at 5:00a.m., three hours early to some members. Others 
never received the weekly page. 
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The communications committee recognized that the alerting system did not 
consistently alert all of the resources needed in a timely manner, thereby delaying 
the response of team members. In July 2005 an additional alerting system, 
CityWatch, was initiated whereby a pre-recorded voice message with deployment 
instructions is sent from a dispatch center to the on call team members. The 
system is designed to send out alerts until the member responds. Participants 
were to update their contact number. That process was not clearly conveyed to 
IMERT members. As a result some members miss the message because it is 
delivered to a telephone number not readily available to them. Efforts to provide 
an alternative or secondary number for notifications have been unsuccessful. For 
example I receive such messages every hour on my home telephone answering 
device which is not helpful if I at work. Other members receive text messages 
inconsistently on other communication devices. IMERT administration 
acknowledges that the CityWatch alert program needs some refinement. 
A new software program has been purchased by the state to enhance 
communications and records keeping. Primary and default wireless addresses 
will be programmed into the application for more consistent messaging. The 
Coordinated Responder Information System (CRIS) has successfully been 
implemented by the state of Florida in their hurricane and disaster preparedness 
efforts. Illinois has modified the CRIS application for the state's needs such as 
grouping of team assignments. Other enhancements include storing members' 
verified credentials and current medical records information, in case of 
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emergency. It is scheduled to be activated in November 2005. This enhancement 
will improve compliance with essential public health service # 9. 
The events of September II, 200 I increased interest with many healthcare 
workers in methods to fulfill the desire to help their country and their community. 
By 2002 IMERT had more than 300 volunteer medical responders. The 
organization was included in the Chicago area component of the national Top Off 
2 disaster drill in May 2003. New opportunities were realized and specialized 
teams were created. 
IMERT Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams were developed and trained 
I 
; 
with the FEMA program guidelines. This federal system i~ a framework for 
structuring local emergency personnel into integrated disaster response task 
forces. These task forces, complete with necessary tools and equipment, and 
specialized training and skills, are deployed by FEMA in times of catastrophic 
structural collapse. All team members are trained and certified emergency 
medical technicians. Positions fall into roughly four categories: search and rescue; 
medical; technical and logistics. The search and rescue positions include 
engineers with expertise in shoring up, bracing, evaluating, breaching and lifting 
structural components, rescue specialists, and search specialists who use trained 
and credentialed search dogs, cameras and listening devices. The medical 
positions include physicians, EMTs, nurses and others who can set up and staff a 
mobile field hospital. Technical positions include hazard materials specialists and 
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communications specialists, among others26 IMERT now has three dedicated 
specially trained USAR teams that rotate call monthly. 
Additionally State Weapons of Mass Destruction (SWMD) IMERT teams were 
organized. Training was based on needs to support Illinois' Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Team (WMD-CST). Illinois is one often states in the 
nation to create WMD-CSTs in 2001. The WMD Civil Support Teams were 
established to deploy rapidly to assist a local incident commander in determining 
the nature and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on 
WMD response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on 
state and federal military response assets. They are joint units and, as such, can 
consist of both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel, with 
some of these units commanded by Air National Guard lieutenant colonels. 
The mission of Weapons ofMass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) 
is to support local and state authorities at domestic WMD incident sites by 
identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, 
advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional military 
support. The WMD civil support teams are able to deploy rapidly, assist local 
first-responders in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and 
technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on 
state and federal military response assets. They provide initial advice on what the 
agent may be, assist first responders in that detection assessment process, and are 
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the first military responders on the ground, so that if additional federal resources 
are called into the situation, they can serve as an advance party that can liaise with 
the Joint Task Force Civil Support.27 
Now when an Illinois State Police Tactical Team or WMD-CST is deployed to 
investigate a possible terrorist operation an IMERT team is deployed, by order of 
the governor, to be their onsite medical provider. Medical assessments of the 
officers are conducted pre and post-exposure to any possible WMDs to measure 
physiologic response to use of personal protective equipment. On-site care is 
provided as necessary for any illnesses or injuries. IMERT SWMD teams are on 
call every two weeks and 16-50 responders could be deployed according to the 
situation. 
IMERT like other response groups was impacted by lessons learned following 
the attacks of 9-11. Members ofthe press and others reportedly had successfully 
forged responder badges in New York City as a means to gain closer access to 
ground zero. Their presence dismpted the work of the tme responders. As a 
result IMERT, like many other response groups, were mandated to cease 
disbursement of identification badges. This was posted 1110/2005 on the IMERT 
website for members: "We are currently implementing a credentialing, tracking 
and identification that will streamline the process. This is a new and time 
consuming task. Please be patient as we transition into the new system. For those 
of you who just attended a boot camp in 2004, you will not be getting an 
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identification badge until all the badges are done. "28 This was consistent with 
essential service #6.29 
Additionally with the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the need for a 
credentialed healthcare workforce to respond to a mass casualty event was 
realized. In disaster situations, individuals who claim to be qualified providers 
and who want to volunteer their services typically approach health care 
facilities 3 ° Congress recognized the need to make optimum use of volunteer 
health personnel in an emergency and authorized development of an Emergency 
System for Advance Registration of Health Professions Volunteers (ESAP-
VHP).31 This national program is a public law and part of the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. HRSA was 
delegated the responsibility for carrying out this legislation and is assisting each 
state in establishing a standardized, volunteer registration system. This was the 
new process referenced on the IMERT webpage. Each state-based system is to 
include readily available, verifiable, up-to-date information regarding the 
volunteer's identity, licensing, credentialing, accreditation, and privileging in 
hospitals or other medical facilites. Illinois is one of ten states to receive funding 
and be accepted into the program. Pilot testing began in the spring of2005. When 
all states systems are functional, a national system will be formed, allowing 
efficient utilization of health professional volunteers in emergencies by providing 
identity and credentials to locations or facilities in need of assistance. IMERT 
will be the first volunteer medical group to have ESAR-VHP ID's processing.32 
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IMERTEC continually researches and responds to emerging guidelines and 
technology which relates to essential public health service #1 0. As the federal 
government developed the National Response Plan, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) training became the gold standard in emergency 
response incident command and communications. In December 2004 NIMS 
training became a new requirement of completion for sustained IMERT team 
membership. It was offered locally and as an online course through FEMA, and 
the content has been integrated into all IMERT training. 
Funding, both annual and biannual, continue with IDPH through federal grants 
from HRSA and CDC. The IDPH Chief of EMS and Highway Safety is 
responsible for grant applications and submissions. The IMERT 
administrator/commander is required to provide weekly reports to IDPH and 
ITTF. Quarterly reports are provided to HRSA. As funding has increased so 
have equipment purchase approvals. IMERT now has 8 Suburban vehicles 
available to transport teams as well as 16 equipment trailers stored at various 
locations across Illinois. The basis equipment cache per team deployment 
represents approximately $50,000. Soon new 24 foot trailers will also be 
available that will carry additional equipment and all terrain dune buggy-like 
patient transport vehicles. 
Also following Top0ff2 IMERT response expectations continued to change and 
membership grew to 900 participants. IMERT team size is currently 7-10 
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members with 13 teams on call at once. There are eight established committees: 
training, communications, research and publications, education, policy and 
procedure, equipment, recruitment and retention and safety. Now with any lEMA 
related event or drill IMERT also participates. April 16-19 this year some 50 
IMERT team members participated in joint exercise training with the CST, Army 
National Guard, and members of the Air Guard in the Springfield area. IMERT's 
SWMD worked closely with the CST and made significant advancements in 
communication abilities and logistical planning that will improve IMERT's 
capacity in future deployments. On April19 both IMERT's General Team and 
SWMD were on standby at Camp Lincoln and the CST staging areas prepared to 
respond in the event of a mass casualty incident. This assignment was considered 
a deployment and was approved by the Governor. After these events team 
members provided feedback and suggestions to improve IMERT's future 
response capabilities. This training opportunity coincided with the dedication of 
the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Library which was attended by the 
four living former U.S. Presidents.33 
The purpose of participation in drills is not to reduce the likelihood of a disaster 
because, by definition, a disaster is an uncontrollable event. Drills are integral to 
the process of troubleshooting weaknesses in emergency plans. They are 
designed both to provide training exercises and to identify weaknesses in the 
response plan so shortcomings can be addressed34 These experiences provide 
lessons also in team dynamics, logistics, knowledge and usage of equipment, and 
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in communications. Additionally it allows for relationship building and trust 
between law enforcement and medical responders35 Essential public health 
services #s 8 and 9 are addressed with these experiences. 
This past summer in 98 degree weather, a WMD drill was held over three days in 
Springfield, Illinois. Participants included Illinois State Police Tactical Teams, 
the state WMD-CST, and an Ohio WMD-CST team. During the course of the 
exercise IMERT teams were deployed. Initial assigmnents on scene included 
conducting pre-medical screens of the officers who would potentially be exposed 
to unknown agents. This began at 10:00 p.m. in an unlighted staging area. The 
IMERT equipment trailer had a generator and fuel, but no electric light fixtures or 
lanterns. Medical staff relied on mini-flashlights to see their watches and blood 
pressure gauges to ascertain and document physical assessments. 
Overnight the drill evolved. There were over thirty college students posing as 
hostage victims who had spent the night in an abandoned poorly ventilated 
building. By morning they were overheated and dehydrated. All required cooling 
with ice packs and oral fluids; some required intravenous re-hydration. The 
volunteer 'pretend' victims had become real world victims requiring medical 
intervention. When the next shift ofiMERT team members arrived on scene at 
7:00a.m., supplies were depleted. It became needs had been underestimated. As 
the new team attempted to locate necessary items each 33 gallon equipment bin 
was opened. None of the containers are labeled with anything listing contents, 
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which was time consuming and frustrating. For volunteers who travel region to 
region the equipment caches need to be consistent with the same stock items and 
readily identifiable contents. Larger equipment trailers, on order, will afford 
better organization of materials. On extended operations one will be set up as a 
base camp trailer with showers and sleeping cots. 
Locally team members were able to purchase ice coolers and plastic bags to make 
ice packs and additional IV s were obtained. As the drill progressed the different 
tactical and WMD-CST groups accessed the building over the course of the day to 
conduct searches for evidence in full protective equipment. They all underwent 
pre and post-entry physical evaluations and all required hydration therapy after 
completing the decontamination process. Some were initially disoriented but 
responded to familiar faces, as medical care was provided. Several confided their 
comfort in recognizing their care providers and the knowledge that they had 
expertise to properly treat them. 
One of the challenges IMERT leadership faces is keeping a balance for its 
members between training requirements and call time. There is a tremendous 
commitment for volunteers and concerns of how to keep then motivated have 
arisen. Incredibly then, another disaster occurs, resulting in renewed interest and 
dedication, and another influx ofiMERT applicants. 
Such was the case this September as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The IMERT 
model has been considered so successful that several others states have sought 
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guidance from the organization in development of such a team. To date there had 
only been conversations about the possibility of IMERT responding within a 
FEMA region, thereby crossing state lines, with no formal memorandum of 
understanding established. IMERT is unique in that it is state supported, 
leadership is the state department of public health, IMERT is purely a medical 
unit, and it is not under the jurisdiction of the emergency management agency. 
Volunteers are considered state governmental employees during deployment for 
the duration of the emergency and are covered by workers' compensation laws. 
IMERT is also very strong in skills and because of the teams' participation in 
drills they function cohesively. 
On August 30, 2005 Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco made an Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) request for medical teams. EMAC, 
executed by 48 states and several territories, authorizes license reciprocity for 
healthcare practitioners in any member jurisdiction during an emergency or 
disaster duly declared by the governor of the affected state. 36 Her request was 
processed within one hour thtough lEMA to IDPH to Illinois Governor Rod 
Blagojevich and IMERT deployment was authorized.37 Suddenly IMERT would 
travel out of state, and new requirements and regulations applied. Concern about 
financial resources and reimbursement for health and medical care provided 
during a mass casualty event applies to all providers, organizations, and sites, 
including governmental, nongovernmental, not for profit, and for profit38 The 
State Emergency Operations Center was also activated to coordinate all state 
relief efforts to the hurricane-ravaged states. The Illinois Office of Homeland 
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Security issued this press release: "The Illinois Emergency Management Agency 
(IEMA)'s response to the catastrophic tropical storm caused by Hurricane Katrina 
is coordinated through the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and 
Illinois officials. The SEOC is in continual contact with emergency management 
officials in the affected areas through the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact (EMAC). The compact includes other states in a mutual aid agreement 
and partnership that facilitates states assisting other states during emergencies."39 
;..__ 
An all call message was sent to IMERT volunteers that a team was requested for 
relief in Louisiana and deployment would be up to 14 days, requiring personally 
provided food and rations for that same period. Those who responded in interest 
were directed to provide financial statements of any loss their employers would 
sustain during their period of absence. ·This could include hiring a replacement 
worker or estimated lost productivity. This step took hours to complete for the 
group of eleven who would go. Final directive to deploy would not occur until 
-
lEMA forwarded the financial requirements to Louisiana for approval of 
reimbursement. That came the next day and the group left for Baton Rouge with 
three trucks and three trailers of equipment. En route they considered fuel needs 
for vehicles and generators while heading to an area already reported to be short 
of gasoline. They purchased and filled large capacity gas cans along the way and 
frequently topped off their vehicle fuel tanks. 
They arrived at Louisiana State University at I :30 a.m. on September I, 2005 
where a field hospital had been staged in the athletic center. No triage system was 
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in progress and the local command structure, most of whom had experienced the 
hurricanes, were overwhelmed. Shortly after arrival the area commander 
requested IMERT assume command of the field hospital where over 220 critically 
injured and ill persons were being treated by a few healthcare providers who 
lacked critical care and trauma experience. By 4:00 a.m. the IMERT 
administrator realized the need for more assistance and a request for deployment 
of additional IMERT members was made. 
That message was sent to volunteers only hours later and the IMERT office was 
flooded with emails and telephone calls. Financial coordination was needed again 
for this group as was team notification, backfilling of teams remaining in Illinois, 
resqurce allocation and re-supplying of equipment. A team of 40 (15 registered 
nurses, 23 advanced life support specialists, and 3 support personnel) were 
gathered. National Guard and military vehicles were also mobilized by order of 
the Illinois governor. 
After many delays this larger group was flown to Baton Rouge on a National 
Guard aircraft the next day. Challenges they faced included the excessive weight 
of foods and drinking water (one gallon per person per day) for 14 days for 40 
volunteers and conflicting military's orders to bring additional gear that would 
exceed safe weight requirements. 
At the LSU field hospital it quickly became evident that the usual position titles 
within the established IMERT command structure confused the local personnel. 
On scene a decision was made to permanently amend titles (field administrator 
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(administrator, command staff,) so they now reflect military chain of command 
(Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander, Commander) with associated uniform 
insignias. The need was also evident for a leader of nursing services. A Chief 
Nursing Officer (CNO) position was created with responsibilities for the health 
and mental health issues of the team members. On all extended operations a CNO 
and Deputy Commander will now be appointed. What remains the same is a 
physician as medical director is in charge of medical operations. These changes 
were emailed to IMERT members immediately. 
What was apparent to all was how well the IMERT command structure does 
work, despite titular changes. A triage method was taught on site to untrained 
volunteers. LSU students were directed to handle traffic control. A credentialing 
check was put in place and approved participants arm banded as identification. 
The CNO organized patient areas and proper triaging of patients was done for 
medical attention and severity and those who required inoculations and shelter. 
The IMERT logistics person became responsible to the unified command that was 
established. 6,100 patients were treated with 3,000 in the first 36 hours of 
IMERT's presence. 2 babies were born, and only 3 deaths occurred- two were 
hospice patients and one person died of dehydration. The teams also inoculated 
and medically screened 150 Louisiana State Police and 500 Illinois firefighters 
who were deployed to assist Louisiana fire departments. 40 
Forty IMERT members returned via an Illinois Air National Guard C130 cargo 
plane on September 8. The remaining eleven returned via ground with equipment 
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on September 10, 2005. Only two members sustained injuries during deployment 
and were treated on site by IMERT physicians. This deployment was truly 
representative of essential service# 741 
Typical of public health programs, IMERT constantly assesses processes, 
evaluates outcomes and makes changes as warranted, demonstrating essential 
service #9 42 Lessons learned reinforced the uniform command structure, that 
Information Technology staff are essential, supplies needs should be anticipated 
and requested before required, mental health/ Critical Incident Stress Debriefing 
is critical, and mobile wireless devices (satellite) are needed. Additionally during 
deployment additional IMERT office staff are needed, all financials must be done 
prior to deployment request, and that the CRIS and ESAR-VHP systems are 
crucial. 
The most recent communication issues center around the code of conduct, 
reimbursement process, and job descriptions. The code includes directives that 
IMERT uniforms are not to be worn outside of official team business, and that 
published materials or statements about IMERT activities must be cleared by 
IMERTEC. While the code has been emailed to members, it is not posted on the 
website. Plans are now in place to add that. The reimbursement policy was 
shared again recently that "IDPH/IMERT policy is that we reimburse all 
mandatory training for specialty teams, deployments and special events as 
approved by IDPH and IMERTEC prior to the event," per an IMERT 
administrative email November 3, 2005. There is no reimbursement for travel or 
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other expenses related to normal training. Finally IMERT members have been 
encouraged to apply for leadership positions such as Lieutenant, but no position 
descriptions are posted on the website or otherwise available for review. 
The ID badge issue is finally near resolution. As of November 2, 2005 IMERT 
reportedly was only days away from creating the badges with the state seal and 
the ESAR-VHP compliant template- newly approved by IDPH. The badges will 
;__ 
contain a bar code that refers to CRIS for specific details of credentials and r-
contact numbers. The badges will not, however, be released until members have 
updated their personal information within the CRIS system. Instructions on that 
process were to be written for distribution also in early November.43 
In disaster planning and response flexibility will always be the key. The events of 
September II, 200 I altered all exiting plans reinforcing the need to be prepared as 
each event will be different, unique and all will be unpredictable. Those involved L 
must be able to rapidly assess and adapt to very fluid situations, inter-agency 
coordination and trust is crucial, and effective communication is critical. The 
steps needed are: assess, adapt, tailor available resources, and respond44 IMERT 
continues to demonstrate its ability to meet these steps. 
The response from IMERT volunteers remains impressive. On November 3, L 
2005, pager calls were sent to IMERT registered nurses with this message," A RN 
team requested by Louisiana to support hospitals. If available for 2 weeks please 
call IMERT office." The request is to relieve nurses in New Orleans who are 
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trying to reestablish critical care units at several sites. Today this is posted on the 
website: "We have a 10 person IMERT Team Awaiting Deployment orders on an 
EMAC request from La. The team is ready for deployment awaiting acceptance of 
the EMAC Response." The IMERT commander ends his written messages with 
this Latin phrase "NON SIB! SED SUIS" which translates "not for one's self but 
for one's people." This reflects the volunteers' sentiment and commitment to 
their roles in public health. 
!____ 
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